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QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF
FLORIDA CASES*
This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis consists of about 150 Florida
cases, excluding memorandum decisions and a few others not of sufficient
importance to be noted here, as found in all of Volumes 51, 52 and 53
of the Southern Reporter, Second Series (advance sheets from April 5th,
1951 through September 27, 1951). In addition there are included some
fifteen Federal cases interpretative of Florida Law. These are found in
71 Sup. Ct. 508 through 1021 (advance sheets from March 29, 1951 to
July 1, 1951), 187 F.2d 2065 through the close of Volume 190 (advance
sheets from April 2, 1951 through October 1, 1951), and 95 F. Supp. 465
through the close of Volume 98 (advance sheets from March 26, 1951
through September 24, 1951).
Commencing with this issue of the Quarterly Synopsis the subject
headings used herein are devised in conformance with the MIAMI LAW
QUARTERLY Five Year Cumulative Index and Digest, as found at the
end of the June, 1951 issue.
AroaRNEYs. Code of ethics. An unprecedented petition was recently filed
with the Florida Supreme Court by an attorney, charging another attorney
with violation of various portions of the Code of Ethics by falsifying and
misquoting evidence in a previous litigation before it. The petition was
rejected in no uncertain terms, the charges determined to be utterly with-
out foundation, the justices sternly admonishing the petitioner to cease
his "character assassination."'I
Reinstatement of disbarred attorneys. Although it is provided that no
convicted felon is entitled to practice lawIa reinstatement of a disbarred
attorney is dependent upon rehabilitation. An attorney who was disbarred
for having committed a felony is entitled to reinstatement upon sufficient
proof of rehabilitation.2
*This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was prepared for publication by Allan S. Kushen,
assisted by Donald C. McCormick.
1. Florida ex rel. Carter v. Beggs, 51 So.2d (Fla. 1951) 'ustice Adams:
. this Court is not a forum to be used as a sounding board to vent his (relator's)
unguarded wrath against opposing counsel. . ." justice Terrell: "... when the sting of
defeat leaves an ugly mark on a lawyer's conscience he needs to give it further discipline.
If he blames some one else for his defeat, or lets it rankle in his mind, makes him re-
sentful, poisons his spirit, or tempts him to lower his standards and he cannot overcome
the habit, he has chosen his vocation unwisely and will never be happy in it regardless
of what it may be. Justice Chapman: ". . . character and integrity are the most valuable
attributes an attorney can take into a courtroom with him.").
)a. FR. STAT. § 39.18 (1949).
2. In re Branch, 53 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1951).
62
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CARRIERS. DUJscontinuance of station. The revenue of the Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad from its station in Longwood for the fiscal year ending
February, 1950, was less than the salary of its agent there. As a high
percentage of its business there occurred from November through May,
it petitioned the Florida Railroad Commission for permission to close the
station from June through October. The petition was denied by the
Commission, but the supreme court reversed that ruling and granted the
request.3
CIvrL SERVICE. Board regulation. The City of Pensacola issued a license
to sell liquor to one of its policemen and rezoned the property on which
his store was located to permit liquor sales. The civil service board later
adopted a resolution prohibiting members of the civil service from engaging
in the sale of liquor or participating in any other enterprise in conflict,
inconsistent with or incompatible with their duties as city employees.4
The policeman was notified by the civil service board to dispose of his
business within ninety days. lie was given a leave of absence without
pay in order that he might determine whether he desired to remain in
the liquor business or return to the police force. Sometime thereafter
he notified the city manager that he desired to return to the police force,
but was unable to sell his business at cost. The city manager suspended
him, preferred charges, and recommended his permanent suspension.
Taking a dim view of the entire affair four justices of the Florida Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the civil service board regulation but decreed
that the policeman be given a reasonable time to choose his vocation.5
Three justices dissented, one basing his dissent on the theory that the
civil service board was estopped from applying its regulation to the instant
situation.
Dismissal of firemen. A fireman under civil service may not be
dismissed for making slanderous remarks about the character and conduct
of the fire chief and accusing him of being incompetent, in the presence of
other members of the department, so long as this action did not impair the
administration of the service in which he was engaged or materially harm
the public interest."
CONFLICt OF LAws. Choice of law. The substantive law of Florida will not
provide the rule of decision in the interpretation of an insurance policy de-
livered in another state twenty-five years previously. 7
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Full faith and credit: Order to receiver. A receiver
for certain designated property and the petitioner was appointed by an Ohio
court. The property included bonds pledged by the petitioner to a Miami
3. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. King 51 So.2d 723 (Fla. 1951); Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. King, 52 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1951).
4. Pensacola Civic Service Rule 13, § 6 (March 1, 1950).
5. Johnson v. Trader, 52 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1951).
6. St. Petersburg v. Pfeiffer, 52 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1951).
7. In re Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 188 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1951).
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bank as collateral for a loan. The receiver was ordered by the Ohio court
to collect the designated property and apply it on its proceeds to the satis-
faction of two Ohio judgments against the petitioner. That order is not
entitled to full faith and credit in the Florida courts,8 and the receiver can-
not maintain suit on the Ohio judgment without first reducing it to a
Florida judgment, since the Ohio court order did not transfer title of the
bonds to the receiver."
Removal and reinstatement of officers. The governor has the
constitutional power10  to recommend to the Florida Senate while
in session the pennanent removal of a member of the Came and Fresh
Water Fish Commission." Even while the Senate is in session he may re-
instate an officer suspended by him prior to its convening, if he has deter-
mined that the charges upon which he was suspended are untrue.'2
CONTRACTS. Damages: Determinable by court in declaratory decree action.
A contract for the sale of citrus groves provided that all hazards and risks
to the assets should continue in this vendor until the transaction was
closed. Another provision in the contract was to the effect that if damage
to the property, between the time of the making of the contract and the
date of closing, was such as to reduce substantially the market value of the
remaining property, the vendee might have the option of terminating the
contract without liability on its part. After the date of the execution of the
contract and before the date of closing a hurricane destroyed a portion of
the fruit on the trees. By mutual consent the sale was consummated on
schedule, the vendor agreeing not to interpose a defense of es.toppel or
waiver should the vendee bring suit. On petition by the vendee for a de-
claratory degree the court held that it could determine the question of
whether the damage was such as to substantially reduce the market value of
the remaining fruit.13
Estoppel. One cannot enforce a division of property different from that
agreed to and accepted without renouncing all rights inconsistent with the
benefit he received.' 4
Non-performance: Excusing notice. An escrow agreement for the sale
of land provided for annual payments, upon the default of any one of which
the vendor might retake the deed from the escrow agent. No payments were
made for three years. During the fourth year, and before the payment for
that year was due, the vendor withdrew the deed from the escrow agent.
On the same day he sold the land to another and notified the defaulting
8. U. S. CONST. Art. IV, § 1.
9. Hotchkiss v. Martin, 52 So,2d 113 (Fla. 1951).
10. FLA. CONST. Art. IV, § 15.
11. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 52 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1951).
12. FLA. CONST. Art. IV, § 15, florida ex rel. Kelly v. Sullivan, 52 So.2d 422 (Fla.
1951).
13. Triple E Development Co. v. Floridagold Citrus Corp., 51 So.2d. 435 (Fla.
1951).
14. Jones v. Neibergall, 53 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1951).
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vendee to vacate. It was held that the vendor had waived strict performance
of the contract and consequently could not declare a forfeiture without first
notifying the vendee of his intent so to do, and without giving him a reason-
able time in which to make the delinquent payments.' 5
Specific performance. An increase in construction costs between the
time of the commencement of a building and the date of a suit for specific
performance of the building contract might, under certain circumstances,
make it inequitable to compel specific performance."
CORPOATXoNs. Name. A corporation chartered "to engage in practically
every type of commercial venture" which operated an apartment hotel and
adopted the name "Sun Coast" cannot enjoin a real estate enterprise from
using the same name.17
COURTS. Discretion: Deficiency decree. The discretion of the trial court to
enter a deficiency decree after a foreclosure sale under a chattel mortgage",
is not absolute and unbridled, but must be supported by established equit-
able principles.19
Discretion: New trial. The granting of a new trial rests primarily in the
sound legal discretion of the trial court, whose determination will not be
disturbed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.20
Jurisdiction: Parties and subject matter. Plaintiff instituted an action
for the wrongful death of her husband, which the defendant moved to dis-
miss. Pending said motion the plaintiff filed a second suit which resulted in
a mistrial. Plaintiff then moved to consolidate the two actions on the ground
that they involved the same subject matter. While that motion was pending
the clerk entered an order dismissing the first suit for failure to file a
declaration. Thereafter the motion to consolidate was granted. The supreme
court held that when the motion to consolidate was granted after the close
of the term, the case was brought over into the new term, and the trial
court therefore had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter.21
lurisdiction: To convict. Fourth felony conviction. The circuit court of
a county other than that in which was entered the fourth felony conviction
which was set forth in an information upon which a life sentence was based
is without jurisdiction to impose a life sentence for a fourth felony con-
viction.22
Subsequent corrective instruction. It is prejudicial error to instruct the
jury that there is a statutory3 presumption of negligence in the defendant
where the plaintiff merely proves that his vehicle was struck by a moving
15. Thomas N. Canton Estate Inc. v. Keller, 52 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1951).
16. Presley v. Worthington, 53 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1951).
17. Sun Coast Inc. v. Shupe, 52 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1951).
18. FLA. STAT. § 702.06 (1949).
19. Scheneman v. Barnett, 53 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1951).
20. Dent v. Margaret Ann Super Markets, Inc., 52 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1951).
21. Slappy v. Fabisinski, 52 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1951).
22. FLA. STAT. § 775.11 (1949); Sellers v. Mayo, 53 So.2d 642 (1951).
23. FLA. STAT. § 768.05 (1949).
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train. The error is not cured by a subsequent general statement by the court
directing the jury to disregard the previous instruction. In order to be effect-
ive, the correction must be both clear and specific. 24
Trial: Defective verdict. A husband and wife sued jointly for damages.
The jury's verdict was given in a formi in which a sum was placed opposite
the wife's name and a check mark opposite that of the husband, the finding
being for both plaintiffs. Such a verdict was held to be defective in sub-
stance. The husband was entitled to a new trial on the question of damages,
even though he made no objection to the form of the verdict until after the
jury had dispersed.25
Trial: Directed verdict, A directed verdict should never be granted
unless the evidence is such that under no view which the jury might lawfully
take of the evidence favorable to the adverse party could a verdict for him
be sustained.2 6 A party moving for a directed verdict admits not only facts
shown by the evidence, but also reasonable inferences favorable to the ad-
verse party which the jury might fairly and reasonably arrive at from the
evidenee.27
Trial: New. It is mandatory that the trial court specify the ground
upon which a new trial is granted. 2
Trial: Upon stipulated facts. Vhen a case is tried upon stipulated facts
the stipulation is conclusive upon both the trial and appellate courts in
respect to those matters which may validly be made the subject of stipula-
tion. On appeal neither party will be heard to suggest that the facts were
other than as stipulated or that any fact was omitted.29
Trial: Verdict. So long as there appears in the record substantial com-
petent evidence to support the verdict of a jury, that verdict must stand.
The trial court has no authority to substitute its conclusions therefor. 0
CRIMINAiL LAW. Fair Trial. A defendant to a charge of lewd and lascivious
conduct does not have a fair trial if the jury is confused and without a medi-
cal report as to his mental status.'
Indictment and information: )efective information. An infornation in
a perjury prosecution charged that the defendant falsely swore in a hearing in
the criminal court of record. The evidence showed that the alleged false
swearing took place before the assistant county solicitor. Such a variance
between allegata and probata is fatal to conviction."
24. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Bailey, 190 F.2d 812 (5th Cit. 1951).
25. Nix v. Sunmnit, 52 So.2d 419 (Vla. 1951).
26. Katz v. Bear, 52 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1951); Bryan v. Loftin, 51 So.2d 724 (Fla.
1951).
27. Katz v. Bear, supra note 26.
28. Fla. Common Law Rule 39 (d); Booker v. Saunders Realty Co., 53 So.2d 912
(Fla. 1951 ).
29, Columbia Bank for Cooperatives v. Okeclanta Sugar Cooperative, 52 So.2d 670
(Fla. 1951).
30. S. A. Lynch Corp. v. Smith, 53 So.2d 532 (Ma. 1951); Martin v. Stone, 51
So.2d 33 (Fla. 1951).
31. Sutton v. State, 51 So.2d 725 (VRa. 1951).
32. Lewis v. State, 53 So.2d 707 (FIa. 151).
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Jury. A jury has the right to ask the trial judge the nature and extent
of the punishment for the crime under consideration, as an aid to its render-
ing of a verdict. 33
Parole. A parolee who is remanded to custody to serve out the unexpir-
ed portion of his term for violation of the parole conditions is not entitled
to have the unserved portion of his sentence diminished by the time he was
out on parole.3 4
Procedure: Bail bonds. Although the Florida Constitution provides that
"Ail persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital of-
fences where the proof is evident or the presumption great,"35 the burden
is on an accused capital offender to show from the evidence that the proof
of his guilt is not "evident or the presumption great."36
Procedure: Motion for continuance. Motions for continuance in crimi-
nal cases are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the
absence of a showing of an abuse of such discretion, denial of such a motion
is not ground for reversal?'
Procedure: Right to counsel. If the record fails to show that the
defendant in a criminal case is not financially able to secure counsel, and
if he is not charged with a capital offense (and thus is not, as a matter
of law, entitled to court38 appointed counsel) refusal to furnish him
counsel is not reversible error.
Procedure: Affidavit for search warrant. A search warrant will issue
only upon evidence that would lead a man of prudence and caution to
believe that an offense has been committed. -" One based on an affidavit
which averred that "the affiant was inforned from reliable source [italics
supplied] . . . that . . . gambling was being conducted" will not stand. 40
Similarly, a deputy sheriff's affidavit which averred that affiant learned
from his investigation and from "information from other persons" that
gambling was being carried on fails to state facts or sufficient reasons upon
which the affiant believed or had reason to believe that the law was being
violated.41
Procedure: Trial. Reversible error was committed by an assistant
prosecuting attorney who, in his argument to the jury, stated: "The time
to stop a sexual fiend and maniac is in the beginning and not to wait until
after some poor little child or some little girl lost her life . . . or mutilated."
It is as much the duty of the trial court to restrain and rebuke counsel
33. Sutton v. State, guora note 31.
34. FLA. STAT. §§ 947.13, 954.06 (1949); Mayo v. Lukers, 53 So.2d 916 (Fla.
1951).
35. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights § 9.
36. Larkin v. State, 51 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1951).
37. Tilghinan v. State, 51 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1951).
38. Tilghman v. State supra note 37.
39. Ft_&. CONST. Declaration of Rights § 4.
40. Averill v. State, 52 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1951).
41. Shaw v. State, 53 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1951).
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from indulging in such argument as it is counsel's duty to refrain from
such inflammatory statements.42
Procedure: Witnesses. Where the testimony of the defendant's wit-
nesses in a criminal case would have.been inadmissible as irrelevant and
immaterial, the refusal of the trial court to summon such witnesses is not
reversible error. 43
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS. Parties and subject matter: Determination of
rights. The police chief of West Palm Beach died in office. That city's
charter provides for the "senior officer in the police department" to act
as chief until a successor is elected.44 Two men had been appointed lieu-
tenants, the highest rank next to that of chief, on the same day. Both
claim the office of chief, pursuant to the charter provision. In such a
situation, a declaratory decree is the proper relief to be sought.5
DIVORCE. Alimony: Limitation of payments. A limitation of alimony
payments to one year's duration should not be made if there is no reason
to anticipate that the wife will be capable of supporting herself after such
time.48
Alimony: Propriety of award. Where the husband's wrongdoing is
the cause of a divorce, the wife will be awarded alimony notwithstanding
that she is "young, attractive and able to support herself."' 7
Alimony: Termination upon remarriage. A husband's liability to pay
alimony to his divorced wife terminates upon her remarriage. 48
Alimony: Waiver and estoppel. A divorced wife brought suit against
her ex-husband for twenty-one years' worth of back alimony. The defendant,
since the rendering of the original divorce decree, has not resided in
Florida, and for the first ten years thereafter his whereabouts were un-
known to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not guilty of laches, since it was
not shown that her delay in bringing suit resulted in injury, embarrassment
or disadvantage to the defendant. Because of the defendant's absence
from Florida, the statute of limitations has not run against the plaintiff's
claim. 49  The fact that she acquiesced in the payment of small sums to
their daughter does not constitute a waiver of the remainder due. 0
Disposal by husband of property. An equity court in a divorce action
may enjoin a husband from disposing of his one-half interest in the parties'
homestead, but where there is shown no intent on his part to convey or
conceal his business property it may not enjoin him from disposing of
42. Stewart v. State, 51 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1951).
43. Tilghman v. State, supra note 37.
44. Fla. Spec. Acts 1947, c. 24981 § 4(21) (i).
45. Lockleer v. West Palm Beach, 51 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1951) The controversy was
decided in favor of the man who had served on the force for the longest period of time.
46. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 53 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1951).
47. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 52 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1951).
48. Friedman v. Schneider, 52 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1951).
49. FLA. STAT. § 95.07 (1949).
50. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 52 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1951).
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"any other property he may own within this state or outside of this state."5 1
Domicile. A wife's removal to another state does not make out such
a prima facie case of change of domicile as to bar her from suing for
divorce in Florida.5 2
Venue. Ai action for divorce cannot be maintained by a wife in
one county, where the cause of action accrued in another and the husband
is a resident of the latter, if he insists upon a plea of privilege, regardless
of whether the wife took up residence in that county to escape mistreatment
by the husband. 53
DOWER. Estoppel to assert. A county judge dismissed with prejudice a
widow's petition against her husband's grantees for an assignment of
dower in lands previously conveyed by him without her joinder. She had
previously elected to take a child's share in lieu of dower. The decision
of the county judge was not appealed. The widow is now estopped from
bringing a chancery suit to set aside dower in the aforementioned lands. 5'
ELECTIONS. Bond elections. Seven proposed bond issues were submitted
to Miami freeholders for approval. A majority voted pro or con on two
of the issues, but less than a majority exercised a choice on the remainder.
The constitution requires a majority of qualified electors to participate in
such an election. 55 Only two of the issues were validated, each issue being
held to comprise a separate election. '0
Primary law. The provision of the primary election law 7 which
requires candidates participating in a primary election to swear that they
did not vote for the nominee of any other party at the last general election,
and to pledge to vote for all nominees of their party at the next general
election is a reasonable legislative regulation and a valid exercise of the
police powerrs which does not violate either the United States Constitution
or the Civil Rights Act.0
Referendum: Title. The ballot on which a substantial majority of
Miami voters approved a municipal low cost housing and slum clearance
project stated the title of the measure, but did not contain in addition a
general statement of the substance of the proposal as required by law." The
court considered that if the title were full enough to put the electorate on
notice of the contents of the measure, that would be sufficient. It held,
51. McRae v. McRae, 52 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1951).
52. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 53 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1951).
53. FLA. SrAT. § 46.01 (1949); Copeland v. Copeland, 53 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1951).
54. Johnson v. Hayes, 52 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1951).
55. FLA. CONST. Art IX, § 6.
56. State v. Miami, 53 So.2d 524 (Fla. 1951).
57. FLA. STAT. § 102.29 (1949).58. Mairs v. Peters, 52 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1951).
59. U. S. CONsT. AMErND. XIV.
60. 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946).
61. § 5 City of Miami Charter, Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 10847.
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however, that the title in this instance was not sufficient 2 and so declared
the election null and void. 3
EQUITY. Mandamus: Laches. A delay of seventeen months between the
time of his dismissal from the police force and institution of a mandamus
action against the city manager to compel reinstatement constituted such
laches by the petitioner as to bar relief.64
Nuisances. A garbage disposal plant is not a nuisance per se and a court
of equity should not grant relief against its operation.
Procedure: Master's hearing. \Vhere a competent master is selected by
the chancellor and attentively conducts the hearings, thoroughly digests the
testimony of the witnesses and arrives at conclusions which are logical and
well supported, his findings should not be disregarded or overruled by the
chancellor simply because of an opinion of the chancellor at variance with
that of the master.,6
Procedure: Summary judgment. The chancellor has a reasonable latitude
in determining whether there is in fact an issue to be tried, and on a motion
for summary judgment may inquire into the qualitative substance of any
pleading, whether filed in good or bad faith.6 7
EsTT'rrs. Entireties: Right of survivorship in murderer. A husband and wife
owned property as an estate by the entireties. The husband was convicted
of his wife's murder. He later purported to convey all the property for-
merly held by entireties to his attorneys in payment for senices rendered
in the defense of his murder charge. On suit by the heirs of his wife it
was held that the husband had only a one-half interest in the property,
since by his wrongful act he had destroyed the marital status upon which
the tenancy by the entirety was based. '!" The dissent would impress the
entire property with a constructive trust for the benefit of the wife's heirs.l)
joint bank account: Right of survivorship. The testator deposited
money in two banks in the name of himself and his wife. In both cases
each signed the signature card. The signature card for one account
62. The title read as follows: "An ordinance Providing for Low Cost IHousing and
Slun Clearance: Providing for Application for Preliminary Advance of FMds by the
Housing Authority of the City of Miami, Florida: Providing for a Cooperative Agree-
ment Between the City of Miami, Florida, Dadc County, and the United States of Ainer-
ica, Acting by and Through Their Respective Duly Authorized Officials and Employes:
and Authorizing and Instructing the City Manager and Any and All the Attached Agree-
ments." According to the court, "It does not say one word to put the voter on notice
whether sewers, water mains, sidewalks and all municipal services would be furnished at
the expense of the City, whether streets would be layed (sic) out, graded and paved or
whether all real and personal taxes, including special assessments, would be remitted,
which necessarily means that the City would become responsible for them."
63. Bryan v. Miami, 51 So.2d 300, 301 (Fla. 1951).
64. Ladas v. Titus, 53 So.2d 523 (Fta. 1951).
65. State ex rel. Knight v. Miami, 53 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1951).
66. Hopping v. Lovejoy, 53 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1951).
67. Fla. Equity Rule 40; Boyer v. Dye, 51 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1951).
68. Hogan.v. Martin, 52 So.2d 806 (Fla. 1951); see Comment, 5 MNIFAx L. Q.,
592 (1951).
69. Ilogan v. Martin, supra note 68. at 807.
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provided that: "Either one or both or the survivor of either are authorized
to sign checks. Signature of either one or the survivor to le sufficient for
withdrawals of all or any part of the funds standing to the credit of the
account." The signature card for the second account states: "If the account
is joint the depositors agree with each other and with the said bank that
all sums . . . shall be owned by the depositors jointly, with the right of
survivorship, and shall be subject to payment upon the check of either . . .
or the survivor . . . ." Both of these accounts were held to be estates by
the entireties although there was no actual gift from the testator to his
wife, with accompanying surrender of dominion. The contention that there
was no unity of control because checks did not have to be drawn by the
spouses jointly was not upheld. Unity of control does not preclude one
from acting for the other.70
Liability of widow for husband's gift taxes. A widow is not liable
to her husband's estate for the amount of gift taxes due during his life-
time on gifts from him to her, and voluntarily paid by his executor after
death.7
Partition of homestead. In a suit between sisters for partition of
ti eir deceased parents' homestead, the defendant is entitled to have credited
to her one-half the reasonable rental value of the property during the time
it was occupied by the plaintiff after the death of the parentsla
EVIDENCE. Admissibility: In eject ment suit. In a suit in ejectlent, evi-
dence of adverse possession, of an equitable estoppel, and of reliance by
defendants and others upon a survey should all be admitted.
2
Admissibility: Other crimes. Evidence of the commission by the de-
fendant of crime other than that of which he is charged is generally in-
admissible, unless for the purpose of identifying the defendant, or of
proving his plan, intent or knowledge, or to show that the acts charged
were not the result of accident, mistake or inadvertence. Even then such
evidence is inadmissible unless there is some other evidence to connect
the defendant with the crime for which he is on trial.
7 3
Circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence must not only be
consistent with guilt, but inconsistent with innocence in order to sustain a
conviction of a crime.
7 4
Exclusion. It is only the death of a sole party to a contract or cause
of action which is in suit or the death of all parties on one side of such
contract or cause that operates to exclude a party on the other side from
70. Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1951); see Comment, 5 MI^Mti L.Q.
136 (1950).
71. Hagerty v. Hagerty, su/ra note 70.
71a. Potter v. Garrett, 52 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1951).
72. Cogwill v. Hopkins, 52 So.2d 343 (Fla. 1951).
73. Padgett v. State, 53 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1951).
74. Harris v. State, 53 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1951); Martinez v. Florida, 53 So.2d 640(ha. 1951).
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testifying on his own behalf to transactions and communications relating
to it as to which the opponent cannot testify.7
Materiality. The materiality of testimony assigned in a perjury pro-
ceeding is a question of law for the court rather than the jury to decide.78
Ownership. The fact that the name of a trucking company is perma-
nently painted on a truck and that that company received permission
to operate it from the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission is a prima
facie showing of ownership for a personal injury action arising out of the
truck's collision with another vehicle.7"
Suicide. Circumstantial as well as direct evidence may he relied upon
in determining whether a death is suicidal or accidental. The court is
warranted in instructing the jury that there is a presumption against suicide
which will support a verdict of accidental death.7 8
Undisputed. Where the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff
is guilty of negligence which contributed to the proximate cause of his
injury, he is barred as a matter of law from recovery3 9
FAmILY LAw. Custody: Fitness of mother. The fact that a mother in
her affidavit for service in a divorce action falsely stated that she did not
know her husband's address would not render her morally unfit to have
custody of her child.8 0
Husband and wife: Liability for care. A husband is not liable for
the care and maintenance of his insane wife in the state hospital. 8'
Marriage: Presumption. Although there is a strong presumption in
favor of the validity of a last marriage, it is not an irrefutable one. Deceased
had married two other women after deserting his first wife. It was estab-
lished that no decree of divorce had been issued in Florida to the first
wife or deceased. Deceased was at all times a resident of Florida. Under
such circumstances the first wife need not account for the whereabouts
of her husband throughout the entire period bctwecn his desertion of her
and his death, and their marriage is presumed to have subsisted until
death.82
FINES AND FORFEIrEJRIS, Sheriff's fee. A court-appointed clisor arrested
several persons oil the charge of conducting a lottery. They were con-
victed, fined $17,250, ad had a judgment of forfeiture entered against
them for $14,187.90, which sum was seized by the elisor on their arrest.
Although the sheriff took no part in the aforesaid proceedings he is still
entitled to a statutory fee of 5% on the fine and forfeitureia
75. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1949); Taylor v. Cory, 53 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1951).
76. Rader v. State, 52 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1951).
77. Wilson v. Burke, 53 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1951).
78. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bell, 188 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1951).
79. Petroleum Carrier v. Robbins, 52 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1951).
80. 'Feel v. Sapp, 53 So.2d 635 (Fla. 1951).
81. Warren v. Boney, 52 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1951).
82. Johnson v. Johnson, 51 So.2d 421 (Mla. 1951).
83. FLA. STAT. § 30.23 (1949); Ilanchey v. State ex rel Roberts, 52 So.Zd 429
(Fla. 1951).
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GAMING. "Anti-Bookie" Law. The "Anti-Bookie" Law84 is to be given a
most liberal interpretation, and so long as telephone facilities arc being
used for gambling purposes the law has been violated, notwithstanding
that the facilities may not be what are technically known as "private
wires."85
Device. A sheriff was enjoined from interfering with the appellant's
use and possession of a mechanical bowling machine. Four justices held
that the device so nearly approximated an actual bowling game that it
was strictly a game of skill rather than one of chance, even though a free
game was given on achievement of a certain score.86 Three justices dissented
on the grounds that to extend the remedy of injunction against a sheriff
while he is attempting to enforce a criminal law is a very harsh proceeding,
and that a free game is actually something of value.87
INSURANCE. Forfeiture of rights. A life insurance policy did not require
a medical examination of the insured prior to its issuance, it being suf-
ficient that he be in good health at that time. It further provided that the
insurer's liability would be limited to a return of the premiums if the
insured was shown not to have been in good health when the policy was
issued. Certain facts made it evident to the insurer's agent that the
insured was suffering from tuberculosis at the time of the policy's issuance.
The insurer continued to receive premiums until the insured's death almost
a year after the policy was issued. On suit by the beneficiary the court
set down some interesting principles of the law of insurance and forfeitures.
The insurer is, of course, bound by the knowledge of its agent. A for-
feiture of rights under an insurance policy is not favored by the law,
especially where, as here, it is sought after the occurrence of the event
which gave rise to the insurer's liability. Morover, when the insurer has
knowledge of facts justifying such a forfeiture, any unequivocal act which
recognizes the continued cxistencc of the policy or which is wholly in-
consistent with a forfeiture constitutes a waiver thereof. The intention
to waive a forfeiture may be inferred from a deliberate disregard of in-
formation sufficient to excite attention and call for inquiry as to the ex-
istence of facts by reason of which a forfeiture could be declared. Guided
by these principles, the court awarded the beneficiary the full amount of
the policy. 8
Policies Exclusion clause. A paying passenger on a regularly sched-
uled commercial air carrier is "participating in aviation or aeronautics"
within the meaning of an exclusion clause in a double indemnity provision
of a life insurance policy. 89
84. FLA. STAT. § 365.01 et seq. (1949).
85. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State ex rel. Transradio Press Service Inc.,
53 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1951); Ervin v. Peninsular Telephone Co., 53 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1951).
86. FLA. STAT. § 849.16 (1949); Deeb v. Stoutarnire, 53 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1951).
87. Deeb v. Stoutamire, supra note 86, at 875.
88. Johnson v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 52 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1951).
89. Pafford v. Standard Life Insurance Co. of Indiana, 52 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1951).
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JUDGMENTS. Enforcement by garnishment. The ancillary remedy of garnish-
ment provided by Florida statute " is available to enforce a judgment of the
United States District Court sitting in Florida."'
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. Iles judicata. Interpretation of a contract was
had in a previous suit. The identical provisions of the contract as adjudi-
cated were then reduced to writing and signed by the parties. A subsequent
action to declare the new contract void for uncertainty is therefore subject
to the plea of rcs judicata. 2
JURIES. Disqualification of juror. One is disqualified as a juror who has
been convicted of certain felonies only if his civil rights have not been
restorcd. 3 A prospective juror who was so convicted but pardoned was
asked only whether he had been convicted. His negative reply, in the ab-
sence of mitigating circumstances, might amount to contempt but would
not disqualify him as a juror.'"
Grand jury. The special legal counsel authorized to be employed by
the Dade County Grand Jury' may not interrogate witnesses.'"
LABOR LAw. Suit against union in common name. An airline pilots' labor
union may be sued in the Florida courts in its common name without
having joined each of its members.9 7
LANDLOR) AND rENANT. Breach of covenant. A lessee's covenant to re-
assign to the lessor on termination of the lease a liquor license issued to
the address of the premises covered by the lease is enforceable by the
lessor, 8 notwithstanding extensive statutory regulations for the granting
of liquor licenses. 0
Use of premises. A lease required the lessee not to use the premises
for any purpose other than a motion picture show. Discontinuance of its
use for such purpose does not furnish grounds for an unlawful detainer
suit by the lessor.10
LIBEL AND SLANDrR. Per se. A false publication to the prejudice of a
person in his business or profession is libelous per se, and in an action
upon it it is unnecessary to prove malice or special damage.' 0
Privilege. An employee of a liquor wholesaler falsely reported that a
sale had been made to a retailer, the wholesaler charging the retailer's
90. FLA. STAT. § 77.01 et seq. (1949).
91. Gullet v. Gullet, 188 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1951).
92. Wolfson v. Rubin, 52 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1951).
93. FLA. STAT. §§ 40.01(2), 40.07(1) (1949).
94. Story v. State, 53 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1951).
95. Fla. Spec. Acts 1949, c. 25765.
96. FLA. STAT. § 905.17 (1949); Robertson v. State, 52 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1951).
97. FLA. CONS?. Declaration of Rights § 4; 41 STAT. 456 (1920) 44 STAT. 1437
(1926); 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1946); FLA. STAT. §§ 447.11, 447.13, 447.15 (1949);
Fla. Common Law Rules 6(c); Fla. Equity Rule 14; Hettenbaugh v. Airline Pilots Ass n
Int'l, 52 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1951).
98. House v. Cotton, 52 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1951).
99. FLA. STAT. § 561.01, et seq. (1949).
100. Floste Corp. v. Marmeles, 53 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1951).
101. Hartley & Parker Inc. v. Copeland, 51 So.Zd 789 (Fla. 1951).
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account therefor. After ten days, in accordance with law, 02 the wholesaler
reported non-payment of the bill to the state beverage director. In a libel
action by the retailer the communication to the beverage director was held
not to be privileged, since the wholesaler had previously investigated the
matter and found that the account was contested and perhaps non-
existent .'03
LICENSES. Accounting. A nonresident accounting partnership was per-
mitted to practice accountancy in Florida by virtue of the fact that one
of the members of the firm was a resident of Florida.10 4 Upon the death
of the resident representative, the entire firm was reorganized and a new
resident manager appointed without permission having been first obtained
from the State Board of Public Accountants. It was held that the firm
could not continue its practice in Florida.'05
Liquor. An American Legion Post which is permitted to serve alcoholic
beverages to its members and certain guests is not a "retail liquor seller"
which must be in an area zoned for liquor sales in order to obtain a state
license to serve liquor.1 06
Pharmacy. An applicant for a reciprocal certificate to practice phar-
macy is entitled to have his rights adjudicated under the law as it existed
when he applied for the certificate. Morever, he is not to be barred from
practice here because he made a lower score on his examination in his
home state than is considered passing in Florida, so long as he fulfilled
the requirements of the state wherein he took the examination. 0 7
LIENS. Mechanic's liens: Choice of remedy. The fact that a plaintiff
could obtain a mechanic's lien should not preclude him from establishing
an equitable lien, if the facts of the situation are such as to permit either
to be asserted.' 08
Mechanic's liens: Delivery to credit of owner. \Vhere building material
is delivered to the credit of the property owner and not to that of the con-
tractor, the materialman is not limited to a pro rata share of a balance re-
maining due under the building contract between the owner and contractor,
but is entitled to the entire amount owed him.10 '
Mechanic's liens: Incapacity to essent. A manager who was employed
102. FLA. STAT. § 561.42(3) (1949).
103. Hartley & Parker Inc. v. Copeland, 51 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1951).
104. FLA. STAT. § 473.16 (1949) (" . . . any certified public accountant or firm of
certified accountants residing beyond the limits of the State of Florida, who was or were
represented on June 25, 1931, in the State of Florida by a representative, agent or man-
ager, shall be permitted to continue to be represented in this state by such representative,
agent or manager, but no new or successor representative, agent, or manager in the State
of Florida shall be appointed, employed, or selected for such certified public accountant or
firm of certified public accountants without the approval in writing of the board first
being had and obtained.").
105. State Board of Accountancy v. Webb, 51 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1951).
106. FLA. SrAT. §§ 561.34, 561.44 (1949); U.S.S. Tampa Post No. 5 of Amer-
ican Legion v. Schlesnan, 53 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1951).
107. Attwood v. State ex rel. Bichert, 53 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1951).
108. Palmer v. Edwards, 51 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1951).
109. Landrun v. Marion Builders Inc., 53 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1951).
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by the purchasers of a farm is not entitled to a mechanic's lien against the
vendors to whom the farm was subsequently reconveyed." 0
Mechanic's liens: Proper payment. Payment to a contractor is "prop-
erly paid" under the mechanics' lien law even though the payment is not yet
due under the contract."'
Mechanic's liens: Waiver. Waiver of a mechanic's lien in favor of one
loaning money on the property in question is inoperative if the loan fails to
materialize.1 2
Special assessments. Special assessment liens against abutting property
in the amount of the proportionate cost per front lincal foot of paving a
street in a residential district should be diminished by the amount of the
depreciation in value of the property measured by the extent to which such
street after being paved was used by the general public over and above the
use which the public would normally make of a residential street."13
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Abatement for want of prosecution. All suits are
deemed abated for want of prosecution after one year if there does not af-
firmatively appear from some action taken by the filing of the pleadings,
court order, or otherwise that such suits have been prosecuted during that
year."14 Change of counsel by the defendant is not such an action as will
toll this period." 5" However, dismissal of an action "with prejudice" under
the aforementioned abatement statute is not a bar to a subsequent suit
on the same subject matter, in the absence of a statute, decision or rule
of practice to the contrary. The phrase "with prejudice" is not authorized
by the statute."10
Statute of limitations on bonds. 'hie statute of limitations applicable
to the bonds from which coupons are detached is likewise applicable to
the coupons." 7
Statute of non-claim. A bill in equity filed over eight months after
the death of the testatrix for specific performance of an oral agreement to
execute a reciprocal will is barred by the statute of non-claiim. 1 8
MOTOR VEHICLES. Parking lots. There is nothing inherently dangerous
about a parking lot."'
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Attornefs fees in eminent domain proceed-
ings. 'rie City of Miami instituted eminent domain proceedings to acquire
110. FLA. STAT. §§ 84.01 et seq., 85-01 et seq. (1949); Lee v. Sas, 53 So.2d 114
(Fla. 1951).
111. FLA. STAT. § 84.05 (8, 10); Landrum v. Marion Builders Inc., 53 So.2d 769
(Fla. 1951).
112. Landrum v. Marion Builders Inc., suPra note 111.
113. Tallahassee v. Baker, 53 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1951).
114. FLA. STAT. § 45.19 (1949).
115. Gulf Appliance Distributors Inc. v. Long, 53 So.2d 706 ( la. 1951).
116. Iasscintetfel v. Howard Iohnson Inc. of Fla., 52 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1951).
117. Panama City v. Free, 52 So.2d 133 (la. 1951). The bonds in this case
were under seal; the coupons were not.
118. FLA. STAT. § 733.16 (1949); Hofer v. Caldwell, 53 So.2d 872 (Fla. 1951).
119. Foley v. Hialeah Race Course Inc., 53 So.2d 771 (Fa. 1951).
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a certain tract of land for a park. After the land owner had incurred
attorney's expenses in preparing for his defense, the city voluntarily dropped
the suit. The landowner contended that reasonable attorney's fees should
have been allowed under Florida statutes.120 The Court of Appeals held
that since the city was acting in its lawful discretionary governmental
capacity, it was not improper to disallow attorney's fees.12
Bond and revenue certificates: Prerequisites for issuance. When
municipal certificates of indebtedness are for an authorized public purpose
and are payable solely from revenues other than ad valorem taxes, they
may be issued without an approving vote of the freeholders. 22
Disannexation. Landowners who institute a quo warranto action to
oust their lands from an area annexed by a municipality make out a prima
facie case by showing that their lands are wild and unimproved and would
not stand to be benefited by annexation. The fact that other landowners
in the vicinity fail to join the plaintiffs in their action does not preclude
them from recovery. 23
Invalid contract. The city of Fort Lauderdale contracted for the
construction and operation of a municipal yacht basin. A subsequent
oral orgreement released the builder from some $200,000 worth of liability
under the original contract. A strongly worded opinion declared such a
verbal contract to be contrary to law, and severely chastised city officials
who made it.' 2 4
Invalid regulatory ordinances. Provisions of a Miami ordinance
limited the speed of trains within the corporate limits to fifteen miles per
hour, required a complete stop at designated crossings, and prohibited
certain other crossings except where the crossing was protected by gates.
Only twelve crossing accidents occurred during the first eight months of
1950. It was held that the aforementioned provisions wpuld disrupt the
railroad's interstate passenger train schedules and would impede the inter-
state movement of freight cargo, and arc therefore unreasonable and ar-
bitrary. Certain other provisions of the same ordinance were contradictory
and confusing, and their enforcement was enjoined. 26
A Miami Beach zoning regulatio 121 which restricts the conduct of
auction sales to two business districts in such a manner as to operate as a
complete prohibition thereof was declared unreasonable, arbitrary and
void.' 28
A statute provides that no municipal zoning regulation is to become
120. FL. STAT. §§ 73.11, 73.16, 74.10 (1949).
121. In re Clark's Estate, 187 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951).
122. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 6; Florida v. Jacksonville, 53 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1951).
123. State ex rel. Watson v. Hallandale, 52 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1951).
124. Universal Construction Co. v. Gore, 51 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1951).
125. Miami Ordinance No. 4061 as amended by 4091.
126. Loftin v. Miami, 53 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1951).
127. Miami Beach Ordinance No. 289,
128. Miami Beach v. Percl, 52 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1951).
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effective without public notice and hearing. 12 After the enactment of that
statute the Legislature authorized the Hollywood City Commission to
appoint a zoning board with such authority "as shall be defined and pre-
scribed by city ordinance."' 3 0 An ordinance authorized the recommenda-
tion of zoning amendments by members of the zoning board without
public notice and hearing.' 3 ' This ordinance was declared invalid., : 2
A municipal ordinance' 33 which requires pasteurization of milk pro-
duced outside the county to be performed within the county ill order that
such milk be eligible for sale within the city is unconstitutional, ' 34 invalid
and unenforceable.18 5
Management of public utility. Courts cannot interfere with reasonable
discretion exercised by a town council in the management of a public
utility which it owns.136
Proper municipal purpose. The acquisition of lands for recreational
facilities is a proper municipal purpose, and the legislature is authorized
to empower cities to provide such facilities and appropriate funds to pay
for them.'8 '
Taxing power. The city of Miami, pursuant to its estimated budget
requirements, duly assessed an occupational license fee in the amount
of $73.80 against a dry-cleaning establishment, which was paid and a
license issued. After passage of its appropriation ordinance, the city
enacted an emergency ordinance a requiring payment by the dry-cleaning
business of an occupational license fee of $250. It was held that the city's
power to further tax the establishment was exhausted when the appropria-
tion ordinance was enacted.39
Tort liability. A municipality acting in its governmental capacity
is not liable for its ordinary torts unless committed in violation of an express
statutory duty. 40
Valid regulatory ordinance. A Miami Beach ordinance permitted
removal of the location of a liquor business with the consent of the city
council, provided that the new location was within two hundred feet of
the old.' 4' A later ordinance required liquor businesses to be situated at
least one thousand feet from each other.14 2 Appellant was authorized under
the first ordinance, but prohibited by the second, from moving his liquor
129. F. STAT. § 176.05 (1949).
130. Fla. Laws 1941, c. 21301.
131. H-ollywood Ordinance No. 585.
132. Hollywood v. Rix, 52 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1951).
133. Ocala Ordinance No. 706 as amended by No. 716.
134. U. S. Coiqsr. AMEnD. XIV, § 1; FLA. Cors'r. Declaration of Rights § I.
135. Gustafson v. Ocala, 53 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1951).
136. Town of Riviera Beach v. Florida, 53 So.2d 828 (FIa. 1951).
137. State v. Jacksonville, 53 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1951).
138. Miami Ordinance No. 3852 (Sept. 7, 1949).
139. Headley v. State cx rel. Walker, 51 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1951).
140. Charlton v. ilialeah, 188 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1951).
141. Miami Beach Ordinance No. 694.
142. Miami Beach Ordinance No. 725 (1944).
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business. It was held that the second ordinance was neither arbitrary,
unreasonable nor discriminatory, and violated neither the Florida Declara-
tion of Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.143
NECLICENCE. Contributory negligence: Not imputed. The Federal Court
of Appeals held that in Florida contributory negligence of the husband
is not imputed to the wife, and for the lower court to instruct otherwise
was error.' 44
Dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The Florida dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine as applied to the operation of automobiles extends, by
analogy, to the operation of airplanes.""
Duty: Of city to pedestrian. It is not erroneous to hold a city insurer
of the safety of a pedestrian who injured herself stepping into a hole on
the edge of a sidewalk where there is evidence of notice on the part of
the city of the condition of the sidewalk prior to the injury..146
Fellow servant and assumption of risk doctrines. Where one servant
requested the serant of another master to assist him in loading a truck
and the latter's negligence caused him injury, neither the fellow servant
rule nor the assumption of the risk doctrine will prevent his recovery. 7
Joint tortfeasors. Where the negligence of two or more persons com-
bines to cause injury to a third person, it makes no difference that neither
of the acts without the concurrence of the other would have caused the
accident. The liability is joint and several. 48
Last clear chance. Although Florida recognizes the last clear chance
doctrine, if the concurring negligence of the plaintiff continued until the
time of the accident, the doctrine does not apply. 49
Res ipsa loquitur: Unexplained hospital burns. The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is to be applied where an unconscious hospital patient suf-
fered serious burns which were unrelated to any treatment prescribed or
received, and which could not be explained by the hospital personnel
charged with her care.'"0
Standard of care. In the absence of statute, an airplane pilot is under
no greater standard of care than that imposed by ordinary tort law.""
Although a failure to exercise the highest degree of care bv a common
143. Glackman v. Miami Beach, 51 So.2d 294 (tila. 1951).
144. Arline v. Brown, 190 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1951).
145. Grain Dealers Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 727 (5th Cir.
1951).
146. Daytona Beach v. Humphreys, 53 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1951).
147. Hicks v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 982 (N. D, Fla. 1951).
148. Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v. Masilotti, 190 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1951).
149. lumphries v. Boersma, 190 Fl2d 843 (5th Cir. 1951).
150. West Coast Hospital Ass'n. v. Webb, 52 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1951)'.
151. Grain Dealers Nat. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 727 (5th Cir
1951).
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carrier for hire is considered only slight negligence, it is sufficient to hold
it liable.1 2
NECOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs. Defenses: Fraud. A minority stockholder of
an insolvent transportation company and an employee thereof purchased
the shares of the majority stockholder and gave him a note therefore upon
his guarantee that an additional franchise could be secured from the Rail-
road and Public Utilities Commission. Although the franchise was not
forthcoming, liability on the note cannot be avoided on the grounds of
fraud or that the agreement was contrary to public policy.' 53
Interest. In a point of first impression the Florida Supreme Court
held that interest runs from the date of maturity of a negotiable interest
coupon, even though no demand for payment be made, unless the obligor
is able to show ability and continued readiness and willingness to pay the
sums due under the coupon at and after the date of its maturity. 54
NUISANCES. Abatement. The defendant lived adjacent to the plaintiff
and for three years engaged in a course of conduct which constituted a
private nuisance. In such a case the remedy at law is inadequate and an
injunction may be had. The nuisance may be abated regardless of the
fact that the defendant may not have been mentally well. The defendant's
husband who acquiesced in and condoned his wife's conduct is liable in
damages therefor. 5
PROCEDUr. Amendment: To demand jury trial. Where neither the
plaintiff nor the defendant has demanded a jury trial in his complaint
or answer, the defendant at a later date may file an amendment demand-
ing such.'
Appeal and error: Ground for reversal. The fact that the trial judge
stated that he would have awarded greater damages than were awarded by
the jury is not ground for rcvcrsal unless the jury was improperly directed. 15'
In general. The oft-repeated and well-established principle that an ap-
pellate tribunal will not substitute its judgment for that of a jury when the
latter has resolved conflicts in evidence and determined issues of fact except
where there is no competent substantial evidence to sustain the verdict, has
been reiterated in the appeal of a malicious prosecution action. 18
One judge to hear appeal. One circuit judge is sufficient to hear an ap-
peal from a civil court of record."
152. Red Top Cab & Baggage Co. v. Masilotti, 190 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1951).
153. Bower v. Seleeman, 52 So.2d 680 (Ma. 1951).
154. Panama City v. Free, 52 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1951).
155. Burnett v. Rushton, 52 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1951).
156. Fla. Common Law Rules 15, 31; Fountain of Youth Broadcasting Co. v.
Church, 51 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1951).
157. Bulmer v. Strawn, 53 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1951).
158. Class v. Parrish, 51 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1951). A consideration of the record in
the instant case prompted three justices to dissent and vote for reversal of the jury's
verdict.
159. FLA: STAT. § 33.11 (1949), Terry v. Ferreria, 51 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1951);
Kosham v. Bernstein, 51 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1951). Although the statute provides that the
circuit court review judgments of the civil court of record "in the same manner" as the
QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF FLORIDA CASES 81
Introduction of exhibits during cross-examination. Only in special
circumstances is the introduction of exhibits permitted during cross-exami-
nation .16
Motions: For final order, A final order in a litigation' was withheld
with the provision that application for such an order might be made upon
the fulfillment of certain conditions. A later motion by one of the parties
for a peremptory writ was denied because he had merely averred fulfilinient
of the necessary conditions without offering proof of the matter averred.
6 2
To dismiss. Appellants' assignments of error were filed long after the
time for such filing had expired.'6 3 Their brief was filed a few days after the
time limit. 64 Nevertheless, it was error to grant appellee's motion to dis-
miss four and one-half months after its filing, since the error complained
of by the appellant was apparent on the face of the record. Where strict
enforcement of the rles of practice tends, in the opinion of the trial judge,
to prevent or jeopardize the administration of justice, the rules should
yield to that higher purpose.,
Parties: Real party in interest. A statutory liquidator under the laws
of Pennsylvania is vested with title to all of the property, contracts and
rights of action of the insolvent company it represents and as such under
Florida statute 6 is the real party in interest. 6 7
Venue: Suits against comptroller. The State Comptroller may claim
the privilege of being sued in the county of his official residence if the
suit is one primarily for the interpretation of the Revenue Act 68 and does
not involve an alleged invasion of the plaintiff's constitutional rights or
an attempt to seize his property for tax collection purposes 9
Writ of error coram nobis. The facts surrounding a petition for a
new trial in a criminal case brought it within the scope of the common
law writ of error coram nobis. The function of this writ is to bring to
the attention of the court some specific fact or facts then existing but not
shown by the record and not known to the court or the party or counsel
at the trial, and being of such vital nature that if known to the court
would have prevented the rendition of the judgment assailed. It is essen-
tial that the mistake of fact be unknown to the applicant at the time of
the trial and could not have been known to him through the exercise of
supreme court reviews circuit court judgments, and although the supreme court must
have a majority of its justices present in order to transact business, it was held that "in
the same manner" applies only to the procedural manner in which appeals are brought,
and not to the substantive manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised.
160. Padgett v. State, 53 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1951).
161. State ex rel, Hawkins v. Board of Control, 47 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1950).
162. State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 53 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1951).
163. PFA. STAT. § 33.11 (1949).
164. Fla. Sup. Ct, Rule 20.
165. Holland v. Miami Springs Bank, 53 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1951).
166. FLA. STAT. § 45.01 (1949).
167. Robertson v. Malone, 190 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1951).
168. FLA. STAT. § 212.01 et seq. (1949).
169. Gay v. Jacksonville Symphony Ass'n, 53 So.2d 110 (Fla. 1951).
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reasonable diligence. Coram nobis supplements but does not supersede
the remedy for granting new trials or the correction of errors. It is a
discretionary writ and will not be employed if any other remedy exists.
Application for the writ must be made within the time provided for
taking a writ of error or appeal, whicl ever is applicable.1711
PROPErTY. Real: Adverse possession. Two contiguous improved lots were
sold by the appellee to different graitees subject to purchase money
mortgages. The grantees quitclaimed their propertics to the appellant,
subject to the mortgages. After the 1926 hurricane caused damage to the
houses situated on the lots, the appellee moved into one of them and
made repairs to both. From then until 1942 she lived alternately in
each. She then settled ill one house and has since remained there, renting
the other to various tenants. In 1927 the grantees gave quitclaim deeds
to her, which were intended to cancel the mortgages. Neither of these
deeds was recorded or produced at the trial, and the mortgages remain
uncancelled of record. The appellee has kept both houses insured and the
property taxes paid. These facts make out a case of adverse possession of
both lots by the appellee, notwithstanding that she at one time was the
mortgagee.' 7'
Tax deeds: Description. A tax dced description which described the
land as "Tract 30, Section 9, Township 48 South, Range 41 East, 20
acres in the County of Broward, State of Florida," is legally sufficient and
not vague, indefinite or uncertain, since it is a well known formula that
was adopted out of necessity by the original owner of all the land in that
general area.
172
Use of airspace. An owner of an airport may not enjoin a contiguous
landowner from constructing a drive-in theater on his property, in the
absence of a showing that it would reasonably interfere with his opera-
tions. The privilege of an airplane to invade the airspace above land in
the possession of another is co-equal with the latter's right to the use of
such airspace, with the balance, if any, in favor of the landowner.7z
RAILROADS. Interpretation of ordinance. A train which crosses a street
does not "go through" that street."14
SALES. Double estoppel. The appellant sold stock in a corporation to
the appellee, in violation of the corporation's by-laws. A stockholders'
suit, in which the vendee was one of the plaintiffs, resulted in a decision
that all sales in violation of the by-laws are void. In a subsequent action
170. Ex parte Welles, 53 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1951).
171. Baldwin Co. v. Mason, 52 So.2d 668 (Fla. 1951).
172. Hawkins v. East Coast Land & Cattle Co., 52 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1951).
173. Reaver v. Martin Theatres of Florida, Inc., 52 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1951).
174. Seaboard Airline R.R. v. Bailey, 190 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1951). A city of
Wildwood ordinance provides as follows: "Every railroad company shall cause the bell
on the engine to be rung before crossing any street in the City of Wildwood, and no train
shall go through any of the traveled streets within the corporate limits of the City of
Wildwood at a rate of speed faster than four miles per hour."
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to determine ownership of the stock in question, the Court of Appeals
held that the vendor is estopped to deny the title of his vendee, and the
vendee is estopped to deny the result of the suit in which he was a suc-
cessful plaintiff. These two estoppels neutralize each other, and the sale
is valid.A'
Risk of damage. Where the vendee is given complete possession of
the property, the right to use it as his own, and has made an unconditional
promise to pay for it, legal title remains in the vendor only as security fox
the purchase price and the vendce incurs the risk of any damage to the
property. 7 1
SCIlooxs AND EDUCATION. Appointment of principal. lie county superin-
tendent of public instruction is required to submit to the trustees of each
school district his recommendation of a person to fill the position of principal
of each district school.' 7 7 rhe trustees, upon consideration of such recom-
mendation, must submit their nominations to the board of public instruc.
tion at least eight weeks before the close of the school year. 78 The board
of public instruction must act on such nominations at last six weeks before
the close of the school year.'71' Unless the trustees make their nomination
within the time limits required by law, the board of public instruction may
upon its own imotion appoint such a principal. 10
S'rATUTES. Budget Act and School Code. Although it was the intent of
the Legislature that the School Code'"' and the Budget Act'8 2 complement
each other, when they are in conflict the former must give way to the
latter. 8 3 However, the Budget Commission does not have the constitu-
tional power' 4 to reduce the school tax millage rate as fixed by the free-
holdcrs.1 5
Local Acts. An act of the legislature authorized any municipality
within counties having a population in excess of 315.000 to prohibit wornen
from mixing or dispensing intoxicating beverages from any bar unless
she were the proprietor thereof.1' Only Dade County came within the
provisions of that act. The supreme court held that there was no relation-
ship between the arbitrary population figure and the object of the legisla-
tion, and that it therefore was a local act. Since it did not fulfill the
175. Syns v. McRitchie, 187 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1951).
176. Greenwood Products Co. v. United States, 188 F.2d 401 (Sth Cir. 1951).
177. FLA. STAT. § 230.33(7)(c) (1949).
178. FLA. STAT. § 230.43(1) (1949).
179. FA. STAT. § 230.23(7) (1949).
180. FLA. STAT. 230.23(7)(c) (1949), Bradshaw v. Pinkston, 53 So.2d 525 (Fla.
1951).
181. Fla. Laws 1939, c. 19353; Fla. Laws 1947, c. 23726; FLA. S'rAT. §§ 227.01
et seq., 237.01 et seq., 237.05-237.24 (1919).
182. Fla. Laws 1943, c. 21874.
183. Chase v. Board of Public Instruction, 52 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1951).
184. Fla. Const. Art. XII, §§ 10, 11.
185. Chase v. Board of Public Instruction, 52 So.2d 122 (Ha. 1951).
186. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25536.
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constitutional requirements of a local act,1 87 it was declared invalid.88
However, an act providing for a grand jury system for counties with a
population in excess of 315,000""' was upheld.'
Regulating pharmacists. A statutory requirement that the State Board
of Pharmacy give the state pharmacy examination to any applicant who is
a graduate of an accredited "school or college of pharmacy holding mem-
bership in the American Association of Colleges of Pharmacy"'' means
such a school or college holding such a membership at the time of the
enactment of the statute.' "'
TAx4TIoN. Cigarette tax funds. A municipality may not impose the state
cigarette tax and use the proceeds therefrom for general operating ex-
penses without making a reduction in its over all ad valorem tax millage. 9 3
Excise tax on insurance companies. A state excise tax was imposed
on the gross premium receipts of insurance companies other than domestic
corporations, which were exciptecd. O Certain municipalities were also
authorized to impose such a tax, but exempting therefrom any insurance
company which "does not now pay such a tax" to the state. 90 A 1945
amendment repealed the exemption of domestic corporations from the
state tax.' 96 A 1949 amendment reinstated the exemption, to commence
with that calendar year."'1 The court construed the word "now" in the
municipal tax statute to mean whenever, from time to time, the provision
was applied. Thus, a domestic insurance corporation was exempt from
both the state and the municipal tax for the year 1949.1 s
Foreclosure: Subsequent sale. "Where tax-delinquent lands are ac-
quired by a county through foreclosure, the delinquent taxpayer is not
tntitled to the proceeds of a subsequent sale of the land by the county
to a third party, even though such subsequent sale is for more than the
amount of the delinqucncy.' 0
Homestead Exemption: Duplexes. Each owner of a separate unit
in a multiplc-falnily dwelling structure is entitled to claim only his pro-
portionate part of the $5,000 homestcad tax exemption, 200 based on his
proportionate part of the assessed valuation of the elntire building.20-
187. FA. CoNrS. Art. III, § 21.
188. Lindsay v. Miami, 52 So.2d 111 IFla. 1951).
189. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 2554.
190. Clcin v. State, 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1951).
191. F.. STAT. § 465.02(1) (1949).
192. Attwood v. State ex rel. Newman, 53 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1951).
193. FLA. STAT. §§ 167.61, 210.03, 210.21 (1949), State ex rel. Panama City v. Gay,
52 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1951).
194. FLA. STAr. § 205.43 (1949).
195. FLA. STAT. § 175.05 (1949).
196. Fla. Laws 1945, c. 22671.
197. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25344.
198. Larson v. American Title & Insurance Co., 52 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1951).
199. FLA. STAT. §§ 194.21, 194.22, 194.23, 194.47, 194.49, 194.55 (1949), Susman
v. Escambia County, 190 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1951).
200. FLA. CONST. Art. X, § 1.
201. Overstreet v. Tubin, 53 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1951).
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Oceanfront pier. A county has the authority to tax a pier erected on
tidelands below the low-water mark of the Atlantic Ocean so long as it
does not attempt to exercise paramount authority against the sovereign
authority of the United States. 202
Sales tax. A merchant who collects Florida sales tax funds and keeps
them separate from his own is not liable to the State therefor upon clear
and convincing proof of their theft by burglary.2 3
Tangible personal property tax. A corporation leased land from the
United States for seventy-five years at a rental of $100 a year, and caused
construction of housing thereon primarily for the use of military person-
nel. The income from the housing is to be paid to the corporation.
Materials furnished by the contractor for construction of the buildings are
therefore not destined to become part of a public project of a govern-
mental unit, and are therefore subject to state tangible personal property
taxes.204
Use of funds. Pursuant to statute Lee County levied an eight mill
tax for general road and bridge purposes 205 and a one-half mill tax for special
road and bridge purposes. 200  It is also provided by statute, "that one-half
of the amount realized from said special tax on property in incorporated
cities or towns shall be turned over to the municipal authorities of said
cities or towns to be used in repairing, working and improving and laying
out the streets thereof .... -207 This proviso applies to both the eight mill
and the one-half mill levy.208
Validity of revenue bonds. The Dade County Port Authority has
the legal authority to purchase the Venctian Causeway between Miami
and Miami Beach and to issue revenue 'bonds payable solely from revenues
arising from its operation, which issuance need not be approved by Dade
County freeholders 0 9
Revenue bonds for the development of the Santa Rosa Island recrea-
tional facilities in Escambia County were validated.2'0 Several contentions
for their invalidity were not sustained. The bonds may be issued in part
for the purpose of refunding the outstanding obligations previously issued
jointly by Escambia County and the Santa Rosa Island Authority.211 The
202. Carnasion v. Paul, 53 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1951).
203. FLA. STAT. §§ 212.04(3), 212.05, 212.07 (1949), Spencer v. Mero, 52 So.2d
679 (Fla. 1951).
204. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(3) (1949); 4 U.S.C. § 105 (1946); 61 STAT. 775 (1947);10 U.S.C. 1270d, (Stipp. 1951); 63 STAT. 570 (1949); 12 U.S.C. 1748f, (Supp. 1951);
Gay v. Jernison, 52 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1951).
205. FLA. STAT. § 193.32 (1949).
206. FLA. STAT. § 343.17 (1949).
207. Ibid.
208. Lee County v. Fort Myers, 52 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1951).209. FLA. CoxsT. Art. IX, § 6, Fla, Laws 1945, c. 22963; Besserner Properties ite.
v. Peters, 51 So.2d 786 (Fla. 1951).
210. State v. Escambia County, 52 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1951).
211. Fla. Spec. Laws, 1947, c. 24500, as amd. by Fla. Spec. Laws 1949, e. 25810
and Fla. Ex. Session Laws 1949, c. 26422.
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bonds do not constitute a debt of Escambia Couty. 212 They are for a
public 213 and proper county purpose.2 14 Delegation of power to the Santa
Rosa Island Authority to govern and regulate the development is con-
stitutional.21' Exemption of the developmcnt from all state taxes is author-
ized and proper.21
The Florida State Improvement Commission Lower Tampa Bay
Bridge Revenue Bonds were validated. The State Road Department and
the State Improvement Commission have the power to enter into a long-
term lease for the property to be developed through the use of the afore-
mentioned bonds. -2 1 7
TRUSTS. Action to enforce. A widow and her stcpson were the decedent's
only heirs. The widow sled her stepson for declaration of a trust in
certain of the decedent's assets. She was not required to institute adminis-
tration proceedings or obtain a personal representative of her husband's
estate before bringing suit. Since there were no other heirs, claimants or
creditors of the estate she was not bound to join such a representative as
a party dcfcndant0 15
Constructive tnsts: Unjust enrich ment. Purchasers of land paid
nine thousand dollars on the fifteen thousand purchase price and madeimprovements thereon to the extent of $3,500. They were ready and
willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. The vendor agreed to
protect the vendees from the existing mortgages on the land and promised
to convey the property to them if he purchased it at a subsequent master's
sale. He induced a friend of the vendees to refrain from bidding at such
master's sale, purchased the property himself, and refused thereafter to
convey to the vendees. Such circumstances are provable by parol evidence,
and if found to exist constitute the establishment of a trust in favor of
the original vendees '9
Plaintiff, defendant and some ten or twelve others were bidding on
some property at a master's sale. When the bidding had reached $1,300,
the defendant requested a recess, took the plaintiff aside, and entered into
an oral agreement with him whereby the plaintiff agreed to drop out of
the bidding, permit the defendant to bid for both of them, and in the
event of his success to pay one-half the bid price in exchange for a one-
half interest in the propcrty. '[he defendant bought in the property for
212. 1r..A. CosT. Art. IX, § 6.
213. FLA. CoNs'r. Art. IX, § 10; Fla. Spec. Laws 1947, c. 24500, as anid. by Fla.
Spec. Acts 1949, c. 25810, § 1.
214. Fla. Spec. Acts 1949, c. 25810, § 1.
215. FLA. Cost. Art. III, § 1; Fla. Spec. Acts 1949. c. 24500, as amd. supra
note 213.
216. FLA. CONST. Art. I. § 9; Fla. Spec. Acts 1949, c. 24500 as amd. supra note 213.
217. LIA. CONsT. Art. IX, § 6; Fi. Spec. Acts 1943, c. 22464; Fla. Spec. Acts 1949,
cc. 26163, 26164; FLA. STAT. §§ 77.01 et seq., 420.01 et seq. (1949); State v. Florida
State Improvement Comn'n, 52 So.2d 277 (Mia. 1951).
218. Pyle v. Pyle, 53 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1951).
219. Tillman v, Pitt Cole Co., 53 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1951).
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$3,750. Such an agreement is not void as being contrary to public policy,
and a refusal of the defendant to convey one-half interest to the plaintiff
will result in the former holding as a constructive trustee for the latter.220
Evidence insufficient to establish. A written contract between a sugar
cooperative and an organization importing labor for it provided for the
former to feed its laborers and deduct $1.20 per day from the wages of
each man therefor. An oral contract between the cooperative and another
provided that the latter would feed the former's laborers at a cost of $1.20
per man per day. The cooperative went into the hands of a receiver
owing a sum for the fceding of the laborers. In the absence of any facts
other than the foregoing it cannot be said that a trust in the funds held
by the receiver existed in favor of the creditor to the extent of the amount
owed, since the establishment of an express, resulting or constructive trust
must be shown by at least a clear preponderance of the proof. 2'-
Purchase Money: Resulting trusts. The general rule is that where the
purchase price of land is paid by one person and title taken in the name
of another, the latter is presumed to hold it in trust for the former. This
presumption does not apply where the purchase price is paid by a husband
and title taken in the name of his wife or child. Such a conveyance is
presumed to be a gift. IHowever, where a wife pays for land and title is
taken in the name of her husband the general rule as to the presumption
of a trust applies. 222
VILLs. Apportionment of taxes. A testamentary provision that all taxes
be paid out of the testator's residuary cstatc so that bcquests to his dis-
tributees might be net and free from them does not preclude their equitable
apportionment between his testamentary estate and his estates by the
entirety. 23
Gift: Inter vivos or request. A mortgagee properly executed a release
of mortgage and placed it in a sealed envelope with written instructions
thereon that it was the property of the mortgagors, to be delivered to them
upon his death. He thereafter, however, continued to collect interest on
the note secured by the mortgage and listed both note and mortgage as
assets of his estate. On the death of the mortgagee it was held that the
release constituted neither a gift inter vivos, gift causa mortis nor a valid
testamentary disposition. -24
Signature. A will in which the signature of the testator appears only
in the attestation clause which follows the text of the will is signed "at
the end thereof"-"-" in conformity with statute.""2 6
220. Rome v. Fincke, 53 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1951).
221. Columbia Bank for Cooperatives v. Okeelanta Sugar Cooperative, 52 So.2d
670 (Fla. 1951).
222. Pyle v. Pyle, 53 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1951).
223. Ilagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1951).
224. Trowbridge v. Cuaranty 'rust Co. of N. Y., 53 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1951).
225. FLA. STAT. § 731.07(1) (1949).
226. In re Schiele's Estate, 51 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1951).
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Uniform Simultaneous Death Law. A will provided for payments
out of a trust to a life tenant, upon the latter's death the corpus to be
divided among certain remaindermen, as a class, who survived. Under
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Law227 the estate of a remainderman
who died in a common disaster with the life tenant will share equally with
the other remaindermen in the trust corpus. 2-
Wn'NEssEs. Contempt of grand jury. A newspaper publisher who refused
to divulge before a grand jury the source of information for a story which
he wrote and had printed in his weekly which purported to reveal testimony
and other secret matters which transpired before that body was held in
contempt. 229
Immunity from process. Although a non-resident who comes to
Florida as a party or witness in a court action is immune from service of
process here during that time, there is no such immunity from process
issued in litigation incidental to or correlated with the subject matter of
the first action.230
VoRK[ N's COIPENSATION. Florida Industrial Commission. When evi-
dence shows the intent of the parties to a casualty insurance contract, but
the draftsman of the policy fails to properly express that intent, the Florida
Industrial Commission has statutory power 231 to interpret the contract to
express the intent of the parties when it was madeY32U
The probity of the evidence offered by a workmen's compensation
claimant is for the Florida Industrial Commission to determine. Its finding
should not be reversed unless shown to be clearly erroneous.233
Injury without accident. Where there was no accident prior to the
experiencing of a heart attack by a worker on his job he is not entitled
to workmen's compensation -.2 34
Measure of compensation. The maximum claim allowable under
workmen's compensation is five thousand dollars in addition to medical
expenses. The provision in the statute which permits payments up to
five hundred weeks is to be treated as surplusage when the total payments
reach five thousand dollars."'-3
Presumption of no accident. Under the Workmen's Compensation
Act there is a presumption that an cxpcrienccd house painter relied on his
experience and knowledge and assumed the most natural and easiest posture
227. FLA. STAT. § 736.05(02) (1949).
228. Miami Beach First National Bank v. Miami Beach First National Bank, 52
So.2d 893 (Fla. 1951).
229. Clein v. Florida, 52 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1951).
230. State ex rel. Ivey v. Circuit Court of Eleventh judicial Circuit, 51 So.2d 792(Fla. 19 51).1. 23 . 1A. STAT. § 440.41 (1949).
232. Blumberg v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 51 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1951).
233. Wesley v. Warth Paint & Hardware Co., 52 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1951).
234. Le Viness v. Mauer, 53 So.2d 113 (Fla. 1951).
235. FLA. STAT. §§ 87.01 et seq., 440.15(5) (a) (b), 440.20 (8)(13), 440.23,
440.25(7), Stanley v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 53 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1951).
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to move and lift a ladder, and an injury sustained thereby was not an
"accident."23 7
Recurring affliction. An employee secured workmeu's compensation
payments from his first employer for a skin allergy caused by exposure
to damp weeds and stagnant water during the course of his employment.
Payments ceased upon his being pronounced cured. Upon his subsequently
securing similar employment with several employers, the affliction recurred.
He was denied further compensation from his first employer. The court
held that by his voluntarily obtaining employment whereby he again be-
cane exposed to the causes of his allergy, the line of causation between
the original and subsequent attacks had been brokenY 3 8
ZoNING. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. A plaintiff who makes a
general attack on the validity of a zoning ordinance need not first exhaust
his administrative remedies as must one who seeks merely to enjoin en-
forcement thereof against himself.23 9
Rezoning and variance. Rezoning ordinarily contemplates a change
in existing zoning regulations within a district, subdivision or other com-
paratively large area in a given governmental unit which theretofore had
been uniformly zoned in its entirety. The granting of a variance usually
contemplates only a special exception to existing zoning regulations in a
specific instance permitting a non-conforming use in order to alleviate undue
burden or unnecessary hardship upon the property owner which the zoning
regulations otherwise impose. Permission to excavate a lake on an eighty
acre suburban tract of wild and unimproved land surrounded by lands
similar in character would constitute a variance.2 40
Variance. An attempt was made to create a town of Northwest Miami.
Property was rezoned by the would-be municipality to permit establishment
of a night club. Northwest Miami was held to be neither a de jire nor
a de facto municipal corporation. 4" The night club proprietor is not now
entitled to a county variance to permit his establishment to remain as
such, and the property must revert to its county zoning status.2 4 2
236. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.01 et seq. (1949).
237. McNeil v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951).
238. Ernest Waters Const. Co. v. Mills, 51 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1951).
239. Miami Beach v. Perell, 52 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1951).
240. Troup v. Bird, 53 So.2d 717 (Fla. 1951); see note, 6 MIAmi L. Q.
241. Farrington v. flood, 40 So.2d 462 (]la. 1949).
242. Kazlow v. Peters, 53 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1951).
